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Response
Linda Schulte-Sasse
Especially in our Western technocracy, we can’t be reminded often
enough that to read a culture is to read its own reading strategies: to
examine what it chooses as its foundational text and what it gleans as
the text’s “true” meaning. Asma Barlas demonstrates forcefully that a
preoccupation with reading is hardly an esoteric, egg-headed exercise,
but one with very real consequences.
Her remedial reading strategies target two willful misreaders of
Islam. The first is like Reverend Lovejoy of the TV show The Simpsons,
who divides the world into “three great religions: Christianity,
Judaism, and miscellaneous.” She is the Western speed reader who
glosses over Islamic culture, translating surface manifestations into
familiar words: terrorism, misogyny, that guy whose name just happens to sound like a swear word, Saddam. We can almost hear this
reader thinking: I know just enough about Islam to know I want out of
there, but not without my daughter. While this first reader is oblivious
to her own illiteracy, the second, “inside” reader knows the text by
heart, or the parts of it that seem to endorse heartless deeds. Like the
first reader, he is also an author, this time of a reverse projection of
something called “Western feminism,” whose imagined decadence
and unnaturalness lets him avoid looking at himself in an unflattering
light.
To be persuaded that this reading problem is not unique to Islam,
we need look no further than our own recent history, where we find
feminism facing a very different challenge. The events surrounding
President Bill Clinton’s impeachment involved less a crisis of morality,
I would argue, than of a critical literacy permitting a reflected engagement with texts, whether fictional, religious, legal, or political. Certainly the impeachment story was not about a specific book like the
Quran being distorted. But it was about a linear, fundamentalist notion
of text used to legitimate an attempted coup d’etat. The House “Managers” had a field day with texts whose meaning was open neither to
ambiguity nor interpretation, but merely invoked as figures of identification: from “America” to “Truth” — which, we were assured, is
“absolute”—and, crucially, to the “Law.”
The Managers incessantly conjured Law as an affective object, a
source of “love” and “pride,” and not as a principle subject to interro154
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gation and contestation; hence, they always already excluded from
consideration the possibility of the law’s perversion. Law was transformed from a secular to a sacred text as each listener was invited to
join a community of those interpellated by it. It wasn’t until that construct known as “The American People” just said no to these machinations that the Managers suddenly became what columnist Frank Rich
called “born again relativists.”
If Quranic misreadings serve to beat women down, the Republican
Right resourcefully took the only route left in the West: to beat feminism at its own game, to appropriate phenomena heretofore known as
“feminist issues,” like sexual harassment. As feminists or just thinkers
we were stuck, torn between distaste at adolescent behavior and the
realization that the “investigation” into and “revelations” about this
behavior were far more prurient, not to mention dangerous, than the
acts themselves.
But one of the good things to come out of impeachment may be that
feminism had to face its own epistemological contradictions. All of a
sudden a crucial feminist tenet, that the personal is political, was
poised to undermine its own presupposition, was threatened by its
own surplus. We saw the possibility that by demanding that total truth
be rendered public, we may engage in the totalizing operation that
constitutes another “ism” — totalitarianism — a system that forcibly
infuses the private with the public sphere. After arguing for years that
sexist creeps could not hide behind the privacy defense (remember
Senator Packwood’s diaries?), we were caught with our own pants
down, outwitted by the morality squad to which we gave birth.
The point is not that feminism was wrong in asserting that the personal is political — it certainly was not wrong — but that every epistemology needs now and then to examine its own assumptions, to be
thrown into a state of therapeutic dyslexia. Impeachment called for
feminism, too, to keep vigilantly rereading and rewriting its own texts.
You might say it offered feminism a much-needed sensitivity training
on the precarious balance of private and public in a democracy.
*****
We have such a vigilant reader in Asma Barlas. But from what position
is Professor Barlas speaking; what is her relationship to her own legitimizing text? I appreciate Barlas’s courage in taking what she calls a
precarious position, a position at odds with what she anticipates to be
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the secular humanist norm at a place like Macalester College. Though I
share most of her views, I happen not to believe as she does, so the
loveable Macalester liberal in me wants to proclaim that I “respect”
Barlas’s religious convictions, thereby ending the conversation. But
that would be what Richard Nixon liked to call “the easy way.”
Instead, I will critique, as opposed to criticize, her position on two
points, ultimately aiming at an endorsement of her essay.
Inevitably, Barlas and I could read the Quran and still be reading
different books; I read words, she reads the Word. My question aims
not at her practice or investment, but at its theoretically-grounded
premise that God’s word is “there” in the Quran if only we can or
could find the “right” mode of reading it. I am reminded of a friend
who likes to say, “I don’t misunderstand you correctly.” If God’s word
is rendered accessible only through the flawed and infinitely misreadable medium of language, how can we separate the message from its
medium and say the medium is, alas, imperfect but the message is
pure?
This is an old dispute indeed, and in Western tradition, the problematic nature of truth and text was, of course, a concern of the
Enlightenment. Perhaps the seminal example is Gotthold Ephraim
Lessing’s drama Nathan the Wise, in which the Muslim Sultan Saladin
demands that the Jew Nathan tell him which of the three religions is
the true one. In place of a clear-cut answer, Nathan offers a story about
a father in a fix because he’s supposed to decide which of his three
sons to leave the family heirloom to, a precious ring that makes its
bearer pleasing to God and man. Unable to decide which son is most
deserving, the father has a goldsmith make two facsimiles, which turn
out to be so perfect that the father himself loses track of which is the
original ring. It is the boys who are in a fix after the father dies, each
one outraged to learn they all received “the” ring from dad. Each son
battles to prove that his ring is the true one, but the judge hearing their
case is not interested in examining the rings — a transparent metaphor
for the three religions. In fact, judging from the sons’ behavior, he
speculates that the real ring must have gotten lost. Instead of passing a
verdict, the judge prescribes a task: the sons should go out into the
world and win the love of their fellow humans and come back in
many, many years, when a wiser judge than he will be able to tell
which ring, as shown by its benevolent effect, is the true one. In other
words, the judge ascribes legitimacy not to an object or text, but to
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social-historical practice, suggesting that the value in a religion is in
what it does in this life and not in its co-option of Truth.
While Lessing’s story is anchored in patriarchy with its privileging
of the father as the subject who is supposed to know, both the biological and the symbolic father divest themselves of authority. They refuse
the patriarchal mandate to choose and privilege, to confer cultural
authority on one truth. If the real ring “probably got lost,” the very
concept and, indeed, importance of absolute truth or authenticity is
called into question — even if we need to live as if there were such a
truth. And Nathan responds to the demand for an “either-or” answer
by telling a story, an aesthetic construct that offers no revelation but
instead demands more work, more interpretation. Alternatively, you
could say that Nathan’s story, though “only” a story, is the only way to
set the reflexive process in motion and that it must be pursued endlessly because to conclude it would be to defeat its point. Hence,
Nathan’s story is shaped like the rings it’s about.
The power of Lessing’s text is its insistence on limitation: of paternal
authority, of textuality, and of truth itself. The more the aesthetic construct “involves” us and the Sultan, the more it seduces us to want to
know how it’s going to turn out, and the more resolutely it refuses to
deliver. In place of closure and the verdict we crave, we’re left with the
judge’s ironic promise that some imaginary future judge, “wiser than
I,” will have the answer. Already in 1779, Lessing knew better than to
wait for Godot.
Though the point of Lessing’s play is religious tolerance, it flies in
the face of any religion by proclaiming truth to be partial and relative,
hence ultimately nonexistent. In this sense, it recalls the claims of contemporary critical theory. In presenting her own project, Barlas draws
convincingly on theories of signification to critique repressive, false
reading strategies. However, the moment she posits that the Quran is
the Truth, she necessarily executes a discursive switch that shuts down
argument. We’re back to that dubious “respect.” When I “respect”
somebody else’s faith, it’s because I can’t argue for or against it. It is
also not uncommon in the West to find a critical theory grounded on
the unfixability of meaning making inroads into religious discourses
grounded in an ultimate meaning. Let me give a hyperbolic example.
At a church service not long ago, I heard a sermon peppered with
casual references to postmodernism and deconstruction(ism). What, I
asked myself, is deconstruction doing in a sermon that is guiding its
congregation toward a truth with which Congressman Tom Delay
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might be comfortable? Is modern religion like capitalism, which, with
its infinite resiliency, makes capital out of its own critique?
The pastor’s gift of a suffix, turning deconstruction into deconstructionism, testifies to a perverse side effect of Jacques Derrida’s success
that fundamentally undermines him. To expose the endless chain of
meaning contained in a text in spite of itself cannot be an “ism.” In
other words, by turning Derrida into his own worst enemy, a prophet,
and his technique into a teaching, the pastor unwittingly achieved the
perfect revenge. Asma Barlas is a far cry from this, but an analogy lies
in her enlisting critical theory as her ally only to harness its implications: deconstructing reading is a good thing until we reach a more
acceptable reading. (I will return to this, however, to argue that on a
political level Barlas’s maneuver is defensible, even necessary.)
My second point of critique involves the opposite move, not harnessing a text but imagining it to be unharnessed. By reading the
Quran as antipatriarchal (indeed, wouldn’t a sacred text, God’s word,
transcend all man-made structures?) might Barlas overlook social
inscriptions of patriarchy in that text? To debunk claims that the Quran
prescribes female oppression is not the same as to show the text to be
antipatriarchal, and I will argue that at least some examples she cites
are infused with the assumptions of patriarchy.
To clarify my argument I’m going to commit heresy and look at
patriarchy in an unfeminist way; to read it with, not against, the grain.
Even more outrageously, I’m going to say that patriarchy is not necessarily to be equated with the bad. In its own understanding, patriarchy
is an order grounded in paternal responsibility as well as privilege.
Historically, this paternal discourse entered European politics precisely along with a moral (as opposed to a Machiavellian) imperative,
reflected in terms like “founding fathers” or the German Landesvater. If
you think I’m talking about some ideology of yesteryear, ask yourself
what Tipper Gore was doing in that photomontage at the Democratic
National Convention that gave a new meaning to the word “embarrassing.” Tipper’s literal presentation of an image (multiple images) of
Al Gore as the devoted father of a nuclear family was premised on the
ideological assumption that this is the necessary precondition for him
to play the same role for the nation qua family — the obvious subtext
being the failed father Clinton. (We can also thank Clinton for the only
new element here: the introduction of a heretofore prohibited sexuality
into this discourse of family. Gore “legalized” Clinton’s transgressive
presidential passion by performing the famous Kiss on none other
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than his wife of thirty years. He thus crossed a line in family discourse
and in the polls, making political capital out of an oxymoronic logic
linking passion and marriage; and what could be more oxymoronic
than to link passion and Al Gore?)
Of course, the contribution of feminism was to read the fine print of
patriarchy and tease out another word with the same root: patronizing.
We came to see that patriarchy excludes, infantilizes, and “others”
women and other groups within its structure. But excluding, infantilizing, and othering does not by definition mean mistreating, and Barlas’s
example of the Quran sanctioning polygamy if the second wife is an
orphan represents precisely an example of patriarchal benevolence.
Wife #2’s social positioning as a parentless child mandates that the
“just” man assume the role of surrogate parent. An antipatriarchal position need not dismiss patriarchal benevolence within an existing context (would we rather see the woman starve?) but would uncover
infantilization as its precondition.
And is the story of Abraham antipatriarchal because an ungendered
God strips the father of his authority? As in Lessing’s drama, the very
preoccupation with paternal privilege echoes a patriarchal structure.
But more importantly, the Quran’s God assumes the ultimate patriarchal function, that of Law — to recall Rumpole of the Old Baily —
he/she/it who must be obeyed. In other words, because patriarchy is
above all a structure, certain of its operations allow gender to take
precedence over sex; a woman can assume a patriarchal function, as I
do when I grade my students, indeed, when I teach them. I am assuming the position the fathers in Lessing’s drama willingly abdicate: the
agent of knowledge and of selection.
What is God doing in the case of Abraham? An irreverent look at
the story might go like this. God says, “Kill your son to prove your loyalty,” and after making Abraham go that far says, “I was just kidding. I
only wanted to see if you’d do it.” Psychoanalysis has a term for this
vision of God: a castrating God. Castration — meant here in a
metaphoric sense of denying patriarchal privilege — and the fear of
castration are what patriarchy is all about. I am even tempted to connect this reading of a sadistic God to abusive social practices, remembering that the more “castrated” humans feel, the stronger our
tendency to seek out someone weaker yet (which is doubtless a source
of patriarchal abuse). Is the implication, then, that the antidote to abuse
is to stabilize patriarchy and hope the Promise Keepers keep their
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promise? How can men feel “whole” without needing illusions of
phallic domination?
Not for a second do these “philosophical” quibbles, however, stop
me from endorsing Asma Barlas’s essay as a strategic/political project,
a project to read women’s emancipation out of (her foes would say:
into) the Quran, assuming that such a reading will enable a more just
social world. As Lessing’s judge says, it will win the love of
humankind. In other words, I do not need to believe in the Quran as she
does to find her Quran appealing. Another source of this appeal is the
subversion Barlas discusses of binary notions like faith and, to use that
American gag word, critical thinking. She highlights the Quran’s challenge to Western binaries, suggesting an affinity with contemporary
theories that likewise challenge those binaries. If Islam tells us that the
road to faith is the intellect, psychoanalysis has argued that intellect
and belief are constantly crossing wires, cross-pollinating, even when
they seem distinct or contradictory. Freud jokes about the man who
not only didn’t believe in ghosts, but was not even frightened of them.
Knowledge (I know very well there’s no such thing as ghosts) does not
contradict belief (just the same, I’m somehow scared of ghosts). Belief
doesn’t lose its power through knowledge.
And how does the Quran’s insistence that the ultimate moral agency
is submission to God ring in our Western ears? It seems weird, perhaps,
given our schooling in individualist ideology. But this maxim accords
precisely with both Kierkegaard’s and Derrida’s readings of the Abraham story.1 Both point to a paradoxical contradiction between intersubjective and absolute responsibility, namely, that absolute
responsibility requires that one be irresponsible in one’s empirical
encounters with others. As Derrida puts it, “Abraham is faithful to
God only in his absolute treachery.”2 (Underscoring my claim that this
is indeed a story rooted in patriarchy, he mentions the “utter absence
of woman in this equation” as “hard to overlook,” and wonders
whether the “logic of sacrificial responsibility” would be changed “if
woman were to intervene in any consequential way.”)
*****
We may be at an impasse about the ultimate nature of meaning, but
more important is Asma Barlas’s insistence that reading matters, and
that people want to read in ways that reaffirm themselves vis-à-vis an
other. Yet if we impute this tautological desire to the bad readers, we

160

Linda Schulte-Sasse

must confess it about ourselves as presumably good readers. As the
saying goes, you don’t become a Marxist by understanding Marx, you
understand Marx because you’re already a Marxist. If the patriarchs
read the Quran patriarchally because they’re already patriarchs (determined, as Barlas tells us, by a social context predating Islam and not
unique to it), Barlas reads the Quran feministically because she’s
already a feminist (determined by contemporary developments). But
so what? This ultimate arbitrariness on a theoretical level need not prevent us from just saying yes to a reading and with it a social project we
believe is right. What remain are strategic problems. We know who
needs to hear Asma Barlas’s reading of reading: the two students we
started out with, the Western slacker and the overzealous Islamic
insider. But if reading is a precondition for liberation, how can these
students be made to read right or at least “righter”?
As a child of 20th century America faced with this question, I involuntarily conjure thrilling, spectacular moments of enlightenment, as
when attorney Clarence Darrow — immortalized by Spencer Tracy in
Stanley Kramer’s Inherit the Wind — put fundamentalism itself on the
stand in the 1925 Scopes Trial on the teaching of evolution. When the
prosecution entered “The Bible” into evidence, the defense countered
with the objection at the heart of Asma Barlas’s argument: “What is
The Bible?” Much like Islamic patriarchs, the Scopes’ judge rejected as
“foreign” the defense’s argument that, as a translation, the Bible was
by definition an interpretation. And like certain Muslim clerics, he
responded with an all too familiar decree: “Let your objection be overruled.” Nonetheless, by trapping opposing council William Jennings
Bryant in his own contradictions when Bryant admitted that the six
days God took to create the earth may have been “periods” lasting millions of years, Darrow spectacularly won the trial and resolved the
issue. Or did he? Why do about half of all Americans still believe God
created humans in their present form? Why does the Scopes trial keep
getting recycled? And why, indeed, is a very male God doing overtime
in our presidential election?
Because the spectacular moment of enlightenment is just that: a
moment of defamiliarization that doesn’t have a prayer against those
familiar and oh-so-reassuring readings. This doesn’t mean that Asma
Barlas, or we, should stop deconstructing readers and reading epistemologies. But we’ll have to live with the kernel of real belief that, like
the living dead, always comes back, always survives deconstruction . . .
until many, many years (or “periods”) from now, when that really
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smart judge who can recognize the right ring tells us how to read with
our minds and not with our guts.
Notes
1. Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, translated by David Wills (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1995); and Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling—The Book
on Adler, translated by Walter Lowrie (New York and Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994).
2. Derrida, p. 68.
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